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Abstract 
This paper contains a critique of solvency regulation such as imposed on banks by Basel I and 
II. Banks’ investment divisions seek to maximize the expected rate of return on risk-adjusted 
capital (RORAC). For them, higher solvency S lowers the cost of refinancing but ties costly 
capital. Sequential decision making by banks is tracked over three periods. In period 1, ex-
ogenous changes in expected returns dμ  and in volatility dσ  occur, causing optimal adjust-
ments dS* / dμ  and dS * / dσ  in period 2. In period 3, the actual adjustment dS* creates an 
endogenous trade-off with slope ˆ ˆ/d dμ σ . Both Basel I and II are shown to modify this slope, 
inducing top management to opt for a higher value of σ  in several situations. Therefore, both 
types of solvency regulation can run counter their stated objective, which may also be true of 
Basel III. 
JEL codes: G15, G21, G28, L51 
Key words: regulation, banks, solvency, Basel I, Basel II, Basel III 
1. Introduction 
Return on risk-adjusted capital (RORAC) has increasingly become the benchmark for assess-
ing the performance and governance of banks’ investment divisions. For them, a higher sol-
vency level has the benefit of lowering the cost of refinancing; on the other hand, it ties costly 
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capital. At the same time, public regulators are concerned about solvency to ensure the conti-
nuity of a bank’s operations. This paper deals with the conflict between the optimization of 
solvency by the bank itself and exogenously imposed solvency levels, taking Basel I and 
Basel II as the example. It depicts a bank in the process of its sequential decision making. In a 
first period, exogenous shocks ( ,d dμ σ ) impinge on the bank’s investment division. A typi-
cal cause could be investments made in the previous period that turn out to have a lower rate 
of return or a higher volatility than expected. In the second period, the division adjusts its sol-
vency level by * /dS dμ  and * /dS dσ , respectively in the aim of attaining again its efficient 
amount of capital prior to rebalancing its portfolio. In the third period, it proposes to top man-
agement to rebalance in response to the changed solvency level through endogenous adjust-
ments ˆ / *d dSμ  and ˆ / *d dSσ . This defines the slope of an internal efficiency frontier on 
which top management chooses the optimum, taking into account its degree of risk aversion. 
This efficiency frontier is modified by solvency regulation such as Basel I and II. It will be 
argued that Basel I neglects that both the cost of refinancing and its relationship with solvency 
depend on exogenous μ  and σ . As to Basel II, it addresses solvency directly but still fails to 
take into account the fact that for a bank that initially just met this standard, the amount of risk 
capital needed to improve solvency changes when μ  falls or σ  increases. It will be shown 
that both Basel I and II modify the slope of the efficiency frontier ˆ ˆ/d dμ σ  as perceived by 
regulated banks. While one might expect that these regulations reduce the slope of the frontier 
(thus inducing top management to opt for lower μ  and lower σ ), it turns out that the oppo-
site can be the case. Indeed, through their neglect of parameters of importance to banks them-
selves, both Basel I and II may have the unexpected consequence of causing at least some 
banks in several constellations to opt for a higher value of σ  (i.e. higher volatility of the rate 
of return on their assets) than without it, causing regulation to miss its target. This risk is like-
ly to increase again in the case of impending Basel III regulation, without however attaining 
the original level of Basel I.     
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a review of the pertinent literature to 
conclude that solvency regulation indeed may serve to avoid negative externalities. In Section 
3, a higher level of solvency is found to have two effects for a bank’s investment decision 
aiming to maximize RORAC. On the one hand, it serves to lower its cost of refinancing; on 
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the other, it ties capital that would have other, more productive uses. This optimum is dis-
turbed by exogenous shocks in return dμ  and volatility dσ , respectively (see period 1 of 
Figure 1). In period 2, the investment division adjusts the bank’s solvency level to these 
shocks. These adjustments are derived in Section 4. However, there can be only one adjust-
ment dS*,  which moves the bank along an endogenous efficiency frontier in the third period. 
The slope ˆ ˆd / dμ σ  of this frontier is derived in Section 5. Top management is presented with 
this tradeoff and makes its choice taking account of its degree of risk aversion. The regula-
tions imposed by Basel I, II, and III are introduced as parameter restrictions in Section 6 to 
show how /d dμ σ  is modified, causing the top management of regulated banks to opt for a 
higher value of σ  than absent this regulation in a number of situations. A summary and con-
clusions follow in Section 7. 
 
Figure 1: Timeline of the model 
 Investment division maximizes RORAC by optimally selecting solvency S; 
shocks dμ , dσ  occur 
2 Investment division adjusts solvency level by dS *  
 
 
Adjustment dS *  moves investment division along the ( ,μ σ )-frontier which is 
modified by Basel I , II, and  III regulation; top management of bank selects  
optimum on ( ,μ σ )-frontier 
2. Literature review 
The solvency regulation of banks has traditionally been justified by the external costs of in-
solvency, especially in the guise of a bank run (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). This view was 
challenged by the proponents of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, who emphasized that for 
well-diversified investors, the solvency of a bank does not constitute a reasonable objective. 
They are concerned with expected profitability, adjusted for the degree to which the bank’s 
1 
3 
t 
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profitability systematically varies with the capital market (the Beta of the Capital Asset Pric-
ing Model). By way of contrast, for little-diversified investors (among them, ordinary con-
sumers holding deposits with the bank), the bank’s overall risk is relevant, which importantly 
includes the risk of insolvency [Goldberg and Hudgins (1996), Park and Peristiani (1998), 
Jordan (2000), Goldberg and Hudgins (2002)]. Option Pricing Theory shows that due to their 
limited liability, shareholders of the bank in fact have a put option that is written by the other 
stakeholders (notably creditors) of the bank [Merton (1974), Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Merton (1977)]. 
When a solvency risk materializes, internal and external costs need to be distinguished. Inter-
nal costs are borne by the bank’s shareholders, who see the value of their shares drop to zero 
unless the bank is in business again. However, in view of the loss of reputation, this re-entry 
would meet with high barriers to entry [Smith and Stulz (1985), pp. 395-396, Stulz (1996), 
pp. 9-12]. In addition, insolvency has external costs (i.e. costs not borne by the insolvent 
bank). First, the insolvency may trigger a bank run [Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Jacklin and 
Bhattacharya (1988), Bauer and Ryser (2004)]. Depositors who are late to withdraw their 
funds stand to lose part of their assets. Some of these depositors may be banks themselves; 
therefore, the insolvent bank may drive other financial institutions into bankruptcy, causing 
substantial external costs [Lang and Stulz (1992), Furfine (2003)]. Second, investors in the 
capital market at large often are affected as well. A bank that becomes insolvent causes own-
ers and creditors of banks in general to re-evaluate the estimated risk of insolvency. In re-
sponse to the revised estimate, they demand a higher rate of interest from their banks, driving 
up the cost of refinancing. There is a substantial body of empirical research substantiating this 
claim [Flannery and Sorescu (1996), Park and Peristiani (1998), Covitz et al. (2004)].  
This research suggests that a solvency level that is deemed optimal by the individual bank is 
too low from a societal perspective because insolvency causes substantial external costs. 
However, it may be worthwhile to emphasize that this conclusion does not suffice to justify 
public regulation to ensure solvency. One would have to first examine whether the expected 
benefit of the intervention exceed its expected cost. An important component of this cost is 
caused by behavioral adjustments that are not intended. The present contribution belongs to 
this tradition of research, which dates back at least to Koehn and Santomero (1980). Charac-
terizing a bank by its utility function and assuming it to optimize a portfolio containing both 
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assets and liabilities, they find that imposing a simple equity-to-assets ratio constraint is inef-
fective on average. Relatively safe banks become safer, while risky ones increase their risk 
position to make up for decreased leverage. In Kim and Santomero (1988), emphasis is on the 
choice of appropriate risk weights in the determination of what has since become ‘Risk-
Adjusted Capital’. Here, the cost of regulation derives from non-optimal risk weights. 
In Rochet (1992), banks choose their asset portfolio taking into account limited liability, 
which may cause them to become risk-lovers. This makes imposing minimum capital  
requirements necessary to prevent them from choosing very inefficient portfolios. However, 
the effectiveness of this regulation is not guaranteed at all. John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000) 
show that U.S. capital-based regulation introduced in 1991 may fail to prevent bank managers 
from shifting risk to outside financiers unless features of their compensation plans are taken 
into account along with the opportunity set of asset investments. More recently, Repullo 
(2004) explicitly has dealt with Basel II in the context of an imperfectly competitive market. 
He derives conditions for two Nash equilibria to obtain, one in which banks invest in riskless 
and another where they invest risky assets. While capital requirements on risky assets do en-
large the parameter space of the ‘prudent’ equilibrium, depositors bear the burden of regula-
tion in the guise of lower interest rates. That is also the reason why in Repullo (2004) capital 
requirements are in general effective in preventing excessive risk-taking by banks. Further-
more, it is shown that Basel II permits a reduction in the overall amount of capital required by 
regulation compared to Basel I. However, pointing to bank-specific problems of governance, 
Mülbert (2009) argues that prudential regulation of the Basel I and Basel II type may even in-
duce rather than prevent banking crises. 
The present contribution differs from the earlier literature in two ways. First, it clearly distin-
guishes between the earlier Basel I and the more refined Basel II regulation, showing that the 
more recent variant may have unintended consequences only for a subset of banks rather than 
all of them. However, Basel III is found to likely increase this subset again. In this respect, 
this work elaborates on and refines the contributions by Kim and Santomero (1988) as well as 
Rochet (1992). The second distinguishing feature of this paper is its emphasis on dynamics in 
the following way. Whereas earlier contributions analyzed optima or [in the case of Repullo 
(2004)] equilibria, here the bank’s path of adjustment from one optimum to the next is ana-
lyzed. Adjustment to exogenous shocks will be shown to be conditioned by solvency regula-
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tion of the Basel I to III type. In return, welfare implications will not be spelled out; rather, the 
fact that banks may be induced to act against the stated intentions of the regulator will be 
highlighted. 
3. Optimal solvency in a model of a bank’s investment division 
Let a bank’s investment division maximize the expected rate of return on risk-adjusted capital 
(RORAC) through its choice of solvency S. It is assumed to act in a risk-neutral manner. This 
assumption can be justified by noting that allowing risk aversion to affect decisions of em-
ployees of the investment division would result in inconsistencies. Employee A (who is 
strongly risk averse) might turn down a client seeking to obtain funding for a project while 
employee B (who has more of a risk appetite) of the same bank would accept it. Top man-
agement needs to avoid such inconsistencies. Therefore, the expectation operator is dropped 
as long as the investment division is being analyzed; risk aversion will enter in period 3 when 
the bank’s top management selects its preferred position on the (μ,σ)-efficiency frontier gen-
erated by the bank’s investment division. A higher level of solvency S enables the bank (and 
hence the division) to obtain funds at a lower rate of interest paid on deposits rD.  
There is no need to define solvency in a formal way; however, it may be thought in terms of 
the likelihood of a shortfall (Leibowitz et al., 1992) or in terms of value-at-risk (VaR) or ex-
pected value-at-risk (EVaR) concepts [see Artzner et al. (2000) for a critique]. Whenever VaR 
or EVar increases, solvency can be said to decrease. Also note that economics is replete with 
latent (i.e. not directly observed) variables ever since Cassels’ (1918) purchasing power par-
ity, Keynes’ (1936) ‘state of confidence’, Friedman’s (1957) ‘permanent income’, and Barro’s 
(1977) ‘unanticipated money growth’. For the argument below, it is sufficient for the level of-
solvency to be a decision variable both for the bank and the regulatory authority. For the 
bank, one has 
( , ),D Dr r S= ⋅   with ( , ) 0Dr SS
∂ ⋅ <∂  and 
2
2 ( , ) 0;Dr SS
∂ ⋅ >∂      (1) 
the arguments other than S are discussed in Section 4 below. The amount of risk-adjusted cap-
ital C > 0 increases with the solvency level S aimed at by the bank, 
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( ),C C S= ⋅  with 
( ) 2 2, 0, 0.CC SS S
∂ ∂⋅ > >∂ ∂           (2) 
Note that equations (1) to (2) suffice to describe the effects a change in the solvency level  has 
on the bank.  
Risk capital C is invested at some hurdle rate (lower than μ  that can be achieved on deposits 
D), which for simplicity is set equal to some risk-free interest rate rf. The financial crisis of 
2007 has shown that such a rate does not really exist; accordingly, there is no security market 
line complementing the efficiency frontier depicted in Figure 2 (see Section 5 below ). The 
risk-free rate used to be associated with the rate of return on government bonds, which in the 
case of Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain have proved to be anything but risk-free. Operating 
costs and taxes are disregarded as well, while regulations affecting equity capital are taken up 
in Section 6. On the basis of these simplifications, RORAC can be expressed as follows, 
RORAC = 
( )( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
( )
, , ,
, ,
D f D
f
r S D r C S r S D
r
C S C S
μ μ− ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅= +⋅ ⋅ .    (3) 
Assuming the volume of the business portfolio and hence D to be constant for simplicity, the 
maximization of RORAC leads to the following first-order condition for optimal solvency, 
[ ] [ ]
[ ]
[ ]* , * , * 0,
, *
D Dr S r S C S
S C S S
μ∂ − ⋅ ∂ ⋅− − ⋅ =∂ ⋅ ∂        (4) 
with the bracket notation pointing to the fact that the endogenous determinant S has to be 
evaluated at its optimal level. Equation (4) can be interpreted as follows. It is optimal for the 
investment division of a bank to weigh the favorable marginal effect of increased solvency on 
the cost of refinancing (first term of the equation, called marginal return of solvency in terms 
of risk cost) against its marginal downside effect (second term, called the marginal cost of 
solvency). The marginal cost of solvency consists of  two interacting components. First, sol-
vency ties costly capital C. Secondly however, this cost is particularly high when the rate of 
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return achievable μ  exceeds by far the bank’s refinancing cost rD. Note because of 
0Dr / S∂ ∂ < , it must be true that Drμ >  for an interior solution. 
Equation (4) indicates that the optimal adjustment to an exogenous change will not be given 
once and for all but importantly depends on parameters not yet specified, in particular the 
risk-return profile inherited from the past. Before substantiating this claim, it is worthwhile to 
note that regulation fixing a solvency level to be adhered to by all at all times does not only 
entail disadvantages. One advantage is simplicity, although the bank’s investment division 
may be hard put to operationalize ‘level of solvency’ in all circumstances. Second, a fixed 
prescribed solvency level in fact makes the cost of (re)financing independent of investment 
decisions, permitting separation of the bank’s lending and borrowing policies, which again re-
sults in an important simplification of management tasks. On the downside, uniform regula-
tion creates a similarity in the decision-making situation of regulated firms, which usually re-
sults in a type of implicit collusion limiting competition. 
4. Adjustment of solvency to exogenous shocks 
Still during the first period, exogenous shocks impinging on rates of return ( dμ ) and volatil-
ity of returns ( dσ ) occur (see Figure 1). To derive the optimal adjustments of the solvency 
level, the following assumptions are introduced. 
As shown in Appendix A, qualitative optimal adjustment of the solvency level S* to a shock 
0dμ >  in expected returns is given by 
sgn dS*
dμ
⎡ ⎤ =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ sgn
2R
S μ
⎡ ⎤∂ =⎢ ⎥∂ ∂⎣ ⎦
sgn
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 21 11D D D D D
D
r r r r rC C
S r S C S C S
μ
μ μ μ μ μ
− − +− + − −+
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ −∂ ∂⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟− + − − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
; 
             (5)  
the terms are signed using assumptions A2 to A9. Therefore, one obtains  
*dS
dμ
⎧⎨⎩
0 0;
0 0.
D
D
if r
if r
μ
μ
< − →
> −              (6) 
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Table 1: Assumptions of the model 
A1: ˆ ;μ μ μ= +  
ˆσ σ σ= + . 
Returns and volatility ( ,μ σ ) are additive in an exogenous ( ,μ σ ) 
component determined on the capital market and an endogenous one  
A2: 0C / μ∂ ∂ < . The higher returns on the capital market, the less risk capital is needed 
to attain a given solvency level. A positive shock on returns makes 
positive net values of the bank more likely, therefore reducing the 
need for risk capital. 
A3: 0C / σ∂ ∂ > . The higher volatility on the capital market, the more risk capital is 
needed to attain a given solvency level. Positive net values of the bank 
are less likely, and this must be counteracted by more risk capital. 
  
A4: 0 1D
r
μ
∂< <∂ . 
The rate of interest paid on deposits reacts to an exogenous increase of 
returns less than proportionally. Otherwise, the condition Dˆ rμ >  for an 
interior optimum [see eq. (4) again] would sooner or later be violated. 
 
A5: 0Drσ
∂ >∂ . 
With increased volatility in the market, the bank must offer better con-
ditions to depositors as well. 
 
A6: 
2
0Dr
S μ
∂ <∂ ∂ . 
According to A4, the bank must increase its interest rate on deposits 
when market conditions become more favorable. However, it can af-
ford to adjust to a lesser degree if its solvency level is high. 
 
A7: 
2
Dr
S σ
∂ <∂ ∂  
2
0Dr
S μ
∂ <∂ ∂ . 
According to A5, the bank must follow the market with its interest 
paid on deposits. However, it can again afford to adjust to a lesser de-
gree if its solvency level is high. The inequality derives from the fact 
that by A4, Dr / μ∂ ∂  is bounded, while Dr / σ∂ ∂  is not. 
 
A8: 
2
0C
S μ
∂ <∂ ∂ . 
A higher solvency level calls for more risk capital but to a lesser de-
gree if higher market returns prevail, making positive net values of the 
bank more likely. 
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A9: 
2
0C
S σ
∂ >∂ ∂ . 
A higher solvency level calls for more risk capital, especially when 
market volatility is high, making positive net values less likely. 
 
These results are intuitive. If the margin Drμ −  is extremely small [note that the pertinent 
multiplier ( )1 Dr / μ− ∂ ∂  is bounded by (0,1)], the investment division’s incentive to preserve 
costly capital becomes of overriding importance, causing it to reduce its solvency level in re-
sponse to an exogenous increase in expected returns. However, when the margin becomes lar-
ger, less capital is needed to attain a given solvency level. This permits to actually increase 
the solvency level. Thus, 0dS * / dμ >  is considered the normal response. 
Now consider a shock 0dσ >  (again, details are given in Appendix A), 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
22 2* 1 1sgn sgn sgn .D D D D D
D
r r r r rdS R dC C
d S S r S C d S C S
μ
σ σ σ μ σ σ σ
− + − + − + ++
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ −∂ ∂⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥= = − − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
             (7) 
Using assumptions A2 to A9 once more, one obtains 
*dS
dσ
⎧⎨⎩
0
0 .
D
D
if r
if r
μ
μ
> −
< − → ∞           (8)  
Again, the results are intuitive. An exogenous increase in volatility of returns makes refinanc-
ing more costly; to counteract this effect, it is appropriate to increase the solvency level if the 
margin is small. Note that ‘small’ does not imply ‘close to zero’ in this case because the rele-
vant term contains Dr / σ∂ ∂  and Dr / S∂ ∂ , which are both first-order. Therefore, 
0dS * / dσ >  can be regarded as the normal response. Yet, in the presence of very high mar-
gins, the opportunity cost of increased solvency becomes excessive, motivating a decrease in 
solvency. 
 
 
 
small; 
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5. Determination of the endogenous efficiency frontier 
In the third period, the bank inherits a net adjustment of solvency dS *  from the second pe-
riod that is the result of responses to the shocks ( d ,dμ σ ) that occurred in the first period. 
The bank’s investment division now proceeds to adjust the endogenous components μˆ  and 
σˆ . Optimal adjustments are described by eqs. (5) and (7), respectively, with dS * now assum-
ing the role of an exogenous shock. By reshuffling the bank’s assets, the investment division 
therefore effects changes ˆdμ  and ˆdσ , creating an endogenous efficiency frontier with slope 
ˆ ˆd / dμ σ , on which top management will proceed to choose the optimum (see Section 6.1). 
This slope can be obtained by dividing (7) by (5), yielding 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2
* 2 2
( )
1 1
ˆ
.
ˆ
1 11
D D D D D
D
S
D D D D D
D
r r r r rC C
S r S C S C Sd
d
r r r r rC C
S r S C S C S
μ
σ μ σ σ σμ
σ μ
μ μ μ μ μ
++ − −+ +− +
− − +− + − −+
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ −∂ ∂− − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= ⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ −∂ ∂⎜ ⎟− + − − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
       (9) 
The sign of eq. (9) is negative both if ( ) 0Drμ − →  and if ( )Drμ −  → ∞ in view of eqs. (6) 
and (8). In Figure 2, these extreme cases are shown for completeness. However, with 
0dS * / dμ >  and dS * / dσ  constituting the normal responses [see the discussion below eqs. 
(6) and (8)], the slope of the endogenous efficiency frontier is positive for intermediate values 
of ( )Drμ −  and hence μ by assumptions A1 and A4. Moreover, a negatively sloped internally 
perceived efficiency frontier in (μ,σ)-space would contradict daily experience on  capital 
markets ( )0d / dμ σ > . A crucial result is that the slope defined in eq. (9) depends not only 
on observable parameters such as ( )D,rμ  and first-order effects the regulator likely is aware 
of such as ( )/ , / , /DC C r Sμ σ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  but also terms such as 2 /C S μ∂ ∂ ∂  and 2 /C S σ∂ ∂ ∂  
which indicate that the relationship between required risk capital and solvency depends on 
conditions on the capital market (see assumptions A8 and A9 again).  
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Figure 2 shows three endogenous efficiency frontiers. Note that μ and μ  as well as σ and σ  
are depicted on the same axis, reflecting the assumption that e.g. a low first-period value of σ  
tends to translate into a low third-period σ. The first frontier (labeled S*) holds prior to the in-
fluence of regulation. The two other frontiers (labeled I and II, respectively) are modified by 
Basel I and Basel II regulation in ways to be discussed in Section 6 below.   
Conclusion 1: Due to its responses to shocks in expected rate of return and volatility in the 
process of sequential adjustment, the investment division of the bank induces 
an endogenous efficient frontier, whose slope also depends on the changing 
relationship between risk capital and solvency. 
6. Effects of solvency regulation on the efficiency frontier 
The objectives of solvency regulation differ from those of the bank, who by assumption seeks 
to be on the efficient ( ),μ σ -frontier as given in (9) and depicted as */ Sd dμ σ  in Figure 2. 
Solvency regulation is designed to avoid the external costs caused by insolvencies described 
Figure 2: Endogenous efficiency frontiers in (μ,σ)-space 
 
Preference 
gradient (A) 
Preference 
gradient (B) 
Iμ∗  
Iσ ∗  *Sσ ∗  *Sσ ∗∗  IIσ ∗∗  
,σ σ  
I 
II 
S* ,μ
μ
 
*
Sμ  
*
IIμ  
*
IIσ  **Iσ  
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in Section 2. Its main instrument is capital requirements, based on the norms of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, an agency of the Bank for International Settlements.  
6.1. Basel I 
Basel I stipulates capital requirements as a function of risk-weighted assets and separately for 
off-balance sheet positions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1988). Its focus is on 
the relationship between solvency and capital. By defining four asset classes with fixed 
weights, Basel I imposes a fixed relationship between solvency capital C and solvency S (see 
the locus B of Figure 3 below). It therefore does not allow banks to react to changes in market 
conditions affecting the risk characteristic of assets. In terms of the model, this neglect 
amounts to the restrictions 
2 2
0 0C C, .
S Sμ σ
∂ ∂= =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂          (10)
  
Inserting this in (9), one immediately sees that the numerator increases while the denominator 
increases. One therefore obtains for the slope of the efficiency frontier (subscript I denoting 
Basel I), 
*
ˆ
ˆ *I S
d d
d dS
μ μ
σ = >           (11) 
The Basel I frontier therefore runs steeper than the original S* frontier, approaching but never 
crossing it for high values of μ because regulation cannot increase the bank’s feasible set. 
One might argue that the bank can choose to act in accordance with parameters it knows to be 
of importance, contrary to the regulator’s decision rule. This amounts to neglecting the restric-
tions stated in (10). However, as emphasized by Power (2004, ch.7), managers are responsi-
bility-averse, leading them to use regulatory decision rules as a convenient justification of 
their own actions. For example, let there be a second-period upward adjustment in solvency 
indicating that the bank should move away from the origin on the efficiency frontier. With the 
flat endogenous efficiency frontier S* auf Figure 1 in view, the investment division would 
propose to accept a substantial increase in volatility whereas based on the steeper efficiency 
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frontier induced by Basel I, the suggested increase is smaller. If the bank’s top management 
were to move along S*, it could be criticized by the regulator for taking on an excessive 
amount of risk. This threat causes a responsibility-averse management to adopt the restrictions 
of eq. (10) and view the steeper Basel I efficiency frontier as the relevant one.   
For predicting optimal solutions, one needs two assumptions regarding the preferences of 
bank’s top management. The first is the assumption of risk aversion on the part of top man-
agement. In principle, fully diversified owners would like management to accept a great deal 
of risk because this allows them to benefit from an increase in the value of their shares [which 
have properties of a call option, see e.g. Zweifel and Eisen (2012), ch. 4.3]. Managers how-
ever, being less than perfectly diversified with their human capital tied to the employing firm, 
have reason to be risk-averse. Given imperfect governance by (dispersed)  ownership, man-
agement can follow its preferences at least to some extent (Shrieves and Dahl, 1992). Second, 
homotheticity of risk preferences is imposed in order to obtain sharper predictions. Under 
these assumptions, Basel I regulation induces the bank to be less conservative regardless of 
degree of risk aversion (type A or B in Figure 2; see the movements from * *Sσ  to *Iσ  and 
from ** *Sσ     to **Iσ  , respectively). 
Conclusion 2: Regulation of the Basel I type is predicted to induce banks to take a more risky 
position than they would on their own, thus having a counter-productive effect in terms of 
stated objectives. 
Note that this prediction holds even if the regulation-induced downward shift of the efficiency 
frontier is minimal. The crucial point is that Basel I signals to banks that interaction parame-
ters their investment divisions would take into account can be neglected, causing their per-
ceived efficiency frontier to indicate that more return can be achieved on expectation for ac-
cepting a given increment in volatility. As an example, consider a bank heavily engaged in the 
financing of mortgages. When expected rates of return in the capital market increase 
( )0dμ > , it can free risk capital (decreasing its effective solvency level somewhat and paying 
a higher rate of interest on deposits) in favor of an investment in a more risky asset without 
violating the Basel I norm. 
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6.2. Basel II 
Basel II allows a choice of approach for the calculation of capital requirements, viz. the Stan-
dardized Approach and the Internal Ratings-Based Approach (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2004). Whilst the first approach is based on Basel I, the second lets banks choose 
their probability of default, their percentage loss at default, and the maturity of their credits. 
Large institutions with average and below-average credit risks mostly prefer the Internal Rat-
ings-Based approach to save on capital despite its higher cost of implementation. In terms of 
the model, Basel II permits these banks to take all elements of eq. (9) into account which 
amounts to a lifting of the restrictions of eq. (10) as long as the constraint regarding the sol-
vency level is not binding.  
 
Figure 3: Implications of Basel II regulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To show this, assume that the bank has opted for the more flexible Internal-Ratings-Based 
approach. Taken together, the rules promulgated by the Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision (2004, especially para. 40 to 44) establish a relationship between a targeted solvency 
level and required risk capital. This relationship (which the bank cannot modify once it has 
selected its internal model) is depicted by the locus labeled F  in Figure 3. It has increasing 
slope to reflect decreasing marginal returns to risk capital as stated in eq. (2). Locus F runs 
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below locus B of Basel I, reflecting that Basel II permits banks to save on risk capital. The 
other difference is that Basel II imposes a minimum degree of solvency, which is denoted by 
IIS .  
Now let a shock 0dσ >  occur (volatility of returns has increased). In keeping with assump-
tion A9, this corresponds to a steepening of the locus, resulting in F ′  from the bank’s point of 
view. It indicates that a given capital C  would now only suffice to guarantee a solvency level 
IIS S<% . Therefore, in order to keep to the Basel II norm, a bank that just satisfied it initially 
would have to come up with the full additional amount of capital ( )C C′ − . Absent Basel II, 
the bank would opt for a point such as Q that entails a somewhat lower solvency level (com-
pared to IIS ) in return for a substantial saving of costly risk capital. 
A bank with excess solvency, symbolized by the combination ( ),S C+ + , would not have to re-
act to the shock 0dσ > . The same conditional responses are predicted for a shock 0dμ < , 
i.e. a drop in the mean return on investments. 
Conversely, consider a shock 0dσ < , i.e. capital markets have become less volatile. For the 
bank, this causes the locus F of Figure 2 to become flatter, such as F ′′ . Now C C′′ <  suffices 
to reach the prescribed solvency level, and the ‘marginal’ bank that was at IIS  initially can re-
duce capital by as much as ( )C C′′− . This of course holds true of 0dμ >  as well. 
In sum, one has the following set of conditional predictions (in absolute value) for Basel II, 
focusing on the critical changes 0dμ <  and 0dσ > , 
2 2
*
0I
SII
C C
S Sμ μ
∂ ∂< <∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   if  0dμ <  and IIS S= .       
2 2
*
0I
SII
C C
S Sσ σ
∂ ∂< <∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   if   0dσ >   and IIS S= ;           (12) 
  
17
Here, 0I  symbolizes the zero restriction imposed by Basel I [see eq. (10) again]. Applied to 
eq. (9) and in view of assumptions A8 and A9, these restrictions again cause the numerator to 
increase and the numerator, to decrease. One therefore obtains, 
*
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆII S
d d
d d
μ μ
σ σ>   if  0dσ >  or 0dμ <  and IIS S= .      (13) 
Figure 2 illustrates once more. Basel II being less stringent (at least by intent), the frontier 
runs higher than that of Basel I but still lower than absent regulation. To make up for reduced 
expected returns, even a strongly risk-averse top management (preferences of type A) is pre-
dicted to opt for a more risky allocation ( )* **II Sσ σ>  provided the bank just satisfied the Basel 
II norm initially. This condition presumably holds as a rule for those banks with a less risk-
averse management (preferences of type B), again resulting in an investment policy that en-
tails a higher volatility of returns than without regulation. In comparison with Basel I, these 
counter-productive effects are less pronounced, since Basel II causes a smaller downward 
shift of the efficiency frontier (see Figure 2 again). 
In sum, Basel I and Basel II are predicted to have similar effects in one respect. Both may in-
duce banks to opt for a more rather than less risky exposure than if they were optimizing free 
of the respective restraints. However, the two regulations differ in another respect. Basel I 
causes a ‘deformation’ of the ( ),μ σ -frontier for all banks. By way of contrast, the ‘deforma-
tion effect’ of Basel II  is limited to the subset of banks who just satisfied the norm initially. 
Conclusion 3: At least for banks just compliant initially with the solvency norm, Basel II may 
still cause banks to pursue a riskier investment policy than absent regulation, 
but less risky than under Basel I.  
6.3. Basel III 
The details of implementation of Basel III regulation are not known yet at the time of writing. 
However, its objective clearly is to prescribe a higher level of solvency, to be attained by 
more solvency capital of which a greater part is to be equity [Bank for International Settle-
ments (2011); Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011)]. In terms of Figure 3, the 
mandated solvency level shifts toward S+ or even beyond. The consequence of this shift is that 
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the set of banks that does not have to react to a shock 0dσ >  shrinks while the set of banks 
that have to come up with the full additional amount of capital to meet Basel III requirements 
increases (see the discussion in Section 6.2 again). Therefore, the steepening of the efficiency 
frontier predicted in (13) applies to a larger subset of banks, at least during a (lengthy) time of 
transition that sees banks struggling to increase their equity and reserves. Moreover, the fact 
that an increased share of solvency capital must be equity means an increase in regulatory 
stringency, causing the endogenous efficiency frontier pertaining to Basel III to be shifted 
back down towards that of Basel I (see Figure 2 again). Conclusion 3 therefore is predicted to 
hold more generally, implying that more banks may in fact be induced to pursue a riskier in-
vestment policy than in the absence of regulation. 
7. Summary and conclusion 
The basic hypothesis of this paper states that banks’ investment divisions seek to attain a sol-
vency level that balances the advantage of lower refinancing cost against the disadvantage of 
tying capital that would yield higher returns in other uses. However, this solvency level is too 
low from a societal point of view because it neglects the fact that insolvency causes substan-
tial external costs. This analysis proceeds to assume that banks’ investment divisions maxi-
mize the rate of return of risk-adjusted capital (RORAC), which implies that the marginal 
benefit of a higher level of solvency is the lower cost of refinancing while its marginal cost 
consists of the extra capital to be allocated and return forgone. These divisions learn the slope 
of their efficiency frontier in (μ,σ)-space in the course of three periods. In period 1, two 
shocks occur, viz. an exogenous change in expected returns ( )dμ  and in their volatility ( )dσ . 
These shocks induce lagged adjustments ( )* / , * /dS d dS dμ σ  during period 2. Net adjust-
ment dS* then triggers a reallocation of assets and liabilities and hence endogenous changes 
dμ  and dσ  during period 3. This implies a perceived endogenous frontier in ( ),μ σ -space 
prior to solvency regulation, with slope 
*
ˆ ˆ/
S
d dμ σ . This slope is not a constant but depends 
importantly on the fact that the relationship between risk capital and solvency is modified by 
exogenous changes in expected returns and volatility occurring in the capital market (Conclu-
sion 1). The regulations imposed by Basel I are now shown to neglect this effect, causing a 
modification of the risk-return frontier as perceived by the regulated bank. This modification 
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induces top management to take a more risky position than it would absent regulation (Con-
clusion 2). The implications of Basel II are more complex. Still, banks initially just attaining 
the prescribed solvency level are again predicted to react to regulation by taking a more risky 
position than they would have otherwise (Conclusion 3). As to Basel III, its likely effect will 
be to increase the subset of banks responding in the same way, running counter the very ob-
jective of the regulators, who want banks take on less rather than more risk.  
All of these predicted adjustments may be considered to amount to regulatory failures. 
.However, it would be inappropriate to conclude that Basel I, II or III or even solvency regula-
tion in general should be revoked. First, the model analyzed in this paper might be too sim-
plistic; banks possibly pursue other objectives than just maximizing RORAC. Second, Basel II 
already constitutes an improvement over Basel I in that its self-defeating effect is limited to 
the (usually small) subset of banks that initially had just been compliant with the prescribed 
solvency level. As to Basel III, the short-run increase in this problematic subset effect has to 
be weighed against the long-run increase in solvency levels generally achieved. And finally, 
assuming that solvency regulation does entail more benefit (in terms of external cost avoided) 
than cost (in terms of biasing banks’ tradeoffs between μ  and σ ), one would have to find an 
alternative whose benefit-cost ratio beats that of  the Basel  type. However, the present work 
does call attention to likely shortcomings of current and planned future solvency regulation 
not only of banks, but of insurance as well [see Zweifel and Eisen (2012), ch. 8.4].  
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Appendix A 
First, consider a shock dμ  disturbing the first-order condition (4). With R shorthand for 
RORAC, the comparative static equation reads, 
2 2
2 * 0.
R RdS d
S S
μμ
∂ ∂+ =∂ ∂ ∂          (A.1) 
Since 2 2/ 0R S∂ ∂ <  in the neighborhood of a maximum, sgn 2 /R S μ⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦  determines  
sgn[ ]* /dS dμ . Differentiating eq. (4) w.r.t.μ , one has 
( )22 2211 .D D DDr r rR C C CC rS S C S C S
μμμ μ μ μ μ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= − − − − − ⋅ − ⋅⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
    (A.2)    
Using (4) to obtain ( ) ( )1/ /D DC S r r S Cμ −∂ ∂ = − − ∂ ∂ ⋅ , one has 
( )22 221 1 1 11 .D D D D DD
D D
r r r r rR C CC r C
S S C r S C r S C S
μμμ μ μ μ μ μ μ
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ −∂ ∂ ∂= − + − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
.            (A.3) 
This can be simplified to become eq. (5) of the text. 
Now consider 0dσ > . In full analogy to (A.1), one obtains from eq. (4), 
22 2
2
1( )D D DD
r r rR C C CC r
S S C S C S
μμσ σ σ σ σ
⎡ ⎤ ∂ ∂ −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎛ ⎞= − − − ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
.   (A.4) 
Using (4) again to substitute C / S∂ ∂ , one has 
  ( )22 221 1 1 1 .D D D D DD
D D
r r r r rR C CC r C
S S C r S C r S C S
μμσ σ σ μ σ μ σ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ −∂ ∂ ∂= − − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ ∂
            (A.5) 
 
Slight rearrangement yields eq. (7) of the text. 
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